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COMMENT
Artficle 37 of the EEC Treaty: State
Trading Under Scrutmiy
Control over international trade often begins at a nation's border,
with the regulation of imports by the government. The most common
instrument employed is the tariff, a tax levied on goods entering a
country.' An alternative tool of government policy is state trading, in
which the government creates a publicly owned enterprise, or
designates a private company, to function as the sole importer of a
product.
This comment will focus in depth on the regulation of state trading
within the European Economic Community (EEC). Historically, many
European nations used state trading as a means of economic planning.2
However, this form of enterprise poses a special problem for the mem-
bers of the subsequently-created EEC. State trading hinders the devel-
opment of a common market among several nations, since goods do not
automatically move freely across national boundaries. Instead, both
1 Three types of tariffs may be imposed on goods. The ad valorum tariff is a tax calculated by
a percentage of the value of the goods being imported. A specific tariff is a flat charge per unit or
quantity of the goods. The third type, a tariff quota, provides a different tariff rate depending
upon the amount already imported into a country. J. JACKSON, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNA-
TIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 440 (1977).
2 Evolution of State Trading Imports (Intra-Europe) Between 1949 and 1958 Expressed in





West Germany 0% 6.9%
Italy 4.6% 4.6%
Other countries ranged from 0 to 27.5%
Ouin, State Trading in Western Europe, 24 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 398, 399 (1959).
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imports and exports are subject to the discretion of state trading mo-
nopolies selecting trading partners and the level of trade itself.
Concerns for potential discrimination are embodied in the Treaty
of Rome,3 forming the EEC. Article 37 of the EEC Treaty explicitly
mandates a policy of non-discrimination in the use of state trading.
Article 37 does not prohibit state trading outright, but requires the pro-
gressive adjustment of state monopolies to eliminate discrimination
against the products of other Member States.
This comment will explore the judicial development of standards
applied in analyzing state trading under Article 37. The success of Ar-
ticle 37 in curtailing the harmful effects of state trading is in marked
contrast with the attempts to regulate state trading found within the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).4 In part, this can
be explained by the development of judicial rather than political stan-
dards for limiting the role of state monopolies within the EEC. The
European Court of Justice (ECJ) has chosen to focus on the effects of
state trading, banning the practice when used to disguise quotas, but
allowing it when necessary to implement national economic goals
which do not discriminate against other Member States.
This flexible standard is a promising step towards the general reg-
ulation of state trading under GATT. This comment suggests the
strengthening of GATT obligations through the negotiation of a com-
prehensive multilateral agreement on state trading, urging the adoption
of a code incorporating the positive obligations of Article 37 as the be-
ginning of effective general regulation of state trading.
I. THE NATURE OF STATE TRADING
State trading occurs when government acts as a principal in inter-
national commerce or authorizes a private enterprise to act on its be-
half. A government may use state trading to achieve a number of
objectives equally desirable for both market and planned economies.
3 Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, entered in force Jan. 1, 1958, 298
U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter cited as EEC Treaty].
4 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, openedfor signature Oct. 30, 1947, 55 U.N.T.S.
194, 61 Stat. A3, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, as amended in 4 GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND
TRADE [GATr], BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS (1969). A list of the numerous
treaties which make up GATT can be found in J. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF
GATT 888 app. (1969).
5 Babon, State Trading and the G477, I1 J. WORLD TRADE L.334 (1977) [hereinafter cited
as State Trading]. State trading has been defined as the "purchase on government account, by an
agent of the government or by a monopoly under its control, with the intention of eventual re-
sale." Leighton, 4n Empirical Study of State Trading, 29 S. ECON. J. 307 (1963).
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State trading can serve to protect domestic products from competition,
promote exports, stabilize domestic prices and incomes, or improve the
balance of trade by directly determining the components of the trade
account.6 Social and strategic purposes, such as the control of the con-
sumption of tobacco and alcohol, or limitation of trade in weapons sys-
tems, may be served through state trading.7
A primary difference between state trading and measures like tar-
iffs and quotas is that through state trading, the government establishes
both the price and quantity of goods traded, whereas with tariffs, it
fixes only the approximate prices of imports, and with quotas, only the
maximum quantity importable.' Distortions of free trade are intro-
duced through a country's use of market power, either monopoly9 or
monopsony,' ° to enhance the national interest at the expense of its
trading partners."I
Another difference between state trading and conventional protec-
tionist measures is the predictability of their effect on the trade between
countries. If other conditions are held constant, the consequences of
imposing tariffs and quotas can be calculated through conventional ec-
onomic theory.' 2 This is not the case with state trading, the effects of
which are indeterminate, depending on the goals and market power of
the trading partners.13 Thus, a country exporting to a state trading na-
tion will have a more difficult task in calculating the level of protection-
ism it faces. Efforts at reducing non-tariff barriers 4 of this sort through
6 State Trading, supra note 5, at 336-37.
7 Id.
8 Leighton, note 5 supra.
9 Pure monopoly consists of one seller for an entire market. See generally F. SCHERER, IN-
DUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 13-15 (1970).
10 Pure monopsony consists of one buyer for an entire market. See W. SHEPHERD, THE ECO-
NOMICS OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 339-42 (1979).
11 See Humphrey, The Economic Consequences of State Trading, 24 L. & CoNTEMUP. PROB. 276
(1959); Leighton, note 5 supra.
12 A tariff produces a protectionist effect which allows domestic industry to expand produc-
tion. The significance of this effect depends on the amount of the tariff and the nature of the
demand for the imported product. The change in the price of the good, and the amount of reve-
nue the government receives will vary with the level of the tariff. A quota produces similar effects
on production, price, and consumption, but the importer, rather than the government, may cap-
ture the added revenue from the increase in price. See C. KINDLEBERGER & P. LINDERT, INTER-
NATIONAL ECONOMICS 111-12, 518-21 (6th ed. 1978).
13 For example, the ability of a country using state trading to influence the price it pays for
commodities will depend on how many sellers there are, the number of competing buyers, the
volume of their purchases, and the volume of purchases by the state trading country. See Leigh-
ton, note 5 supra.
14 An inventory of over eight hundred non-tariff barriers to trade can be found in HOUSE
COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 93D CONG., IST SESS., BRIEFING MATERIALS ON FOREIGN TRADE
AND TARIFFS 54-150 (Comm. Print. 1973).
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bilateral or multilateral negotiations are hampered by the inability of
parties to quantify the effect of state trading on their national interest. 5
The actual practices of state trading monopolies can be placed into
three main categories. First, the functional equivalent of taxes or subsi-
dies may be implemented through the creation of the differentials be-
tween domestic prices and those paid on the world market.16 Second,
the functional equivalent of quotas may be implemented through the
determination of the quantities to be imported or exported.' 7 Third, a
policy of discrimination may be effected through the selection of trad-
ing partners.'8
State trading also introduces the government into the market in
direct competition with private firms.19 Unless private and public firms
are bound by common rules of competition, private firms may be at a
disadvantage because of the financial resources of the national govern-
ment supporting public firms.20 This is a significant problem for the
EEC which at the time of its formation, had many state monopolies
affecting important segments of the economy, especially in primary
products.2'
II. STATE TRADING UNDER GATT
The EEC Treaty was not the first multilateral attempt to deal with
state trading. Both the draft charter of the International Trade Organi-
zation (ITO) and the GATT, although focusing on the reduction of
tariffs, had provisions restricting the use of state trading 2 2 Gains in
trade negotiations are potentially jeopardized if state trading countries
retain full discretion in the price and quantity of goods imported. A
state trading monopoly's ability to choose its trading partners also calls
into question compliance with the Most Favored Nation (MFN)23 obli-
15 See Leighton, note 5 supra.
16 State Trading, supra note 5, at 334-35.
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 The effect of competition from public enterprise is a particularly significant problem for the
EEC since each Member State relies on nationalized industries to varying degrees.
20 Article 90 of the EEC Treaty, note 3 supra, applies the Community competition rules to
both public and private firms. The relationship between Articles 37 and 90 is explored in
BENZONI et. al., L'ENTERPRISE PuBLIC ET LA CONCURRENCE 1969 (Semaine de Bruges 1968).
21 As of 1958, EEC countries used state trading for such commodities as tobacco, wheat, rice,
butter, sugar, bananas, salt and alcohol. Ouin, supra note 2, at 403-04.
22 United Nations Conference on Trade and Employement, held at Havana, Cuba, from Nov.
21, 1947, to March 24, 1948, Final Acts and related documents, chapter 4, section D (State Trad-
ing and Related Matters) arts. 29-32 (Mar. 1948): GATT Article XVII [hereinafter cited as United
Nations Conference].
23 The MFN obligations of GATT require that:
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gation of GATT contracting parties.24
A system of state trading runs counter to basic GATT notions con-
cerning the organization of international trade. GATT implicitly as-
sumes that the volume and nature of imports and exports will be
largely a function of price.25 This suggests that the tariff is the principal
instrument of regulation by raising or lowering the price of goods.26
Acting in accordance with the general assumption of free trade, GATT
sought to eliminate discrimination in trade,27 bind tariffs to then cur-
rent levels, and progressively reduce them to promote a greater volume
of trade.28
However, the existence of a tariff is unlikely to be central to the
decision making of a state trading country. As Professor Dam has
observed,
A commitment by such a country to give most-favored-nation treatment
cannot be discharged simply by imposing identical tariffs on imports from
all countries, for where the importing agencies follow political criteria
rather than so-called commercial criteria (such as price and quality) in
selecting foreign suppliers, uniformity of customs duties is irrelevant.29
In order to prevent the subversion of GATT obligations through state
trading, Article XVII imposed three duties on contracting parties. The
most critical provision is the requirement of non-discriminatory treat-
ment of trade. Article XVII (1)(a) states: Each contracting party un-
dertakes that if it establishes or maintains a State enterprise, wherever
located, or grants to any enterprise, formally or in effect, exclusive or
special privileges, such enterprise shall, in its purchases or sales involv-
ing either imports or exports, act in a manner consistent with the gen-
eral principles of non-discriminatory treatment prescribed in this
Agreement for governmental measures affecting imports or exports by
any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted by any contracting party to any prod-
uct originating in or destined for any other country shall be accorded immediately and un-
conditionally to the like product originating or destined for the territories of all other
contracting parties.
GATT, supra note 4, at art. I.
24 Domke & Hazard, State Trading andthe Most-Favored-Nation Clause, 52 AM. J. INT'L L. 55
(1958); Hazard, Editorial Comment: Commercial Discrimination and International Law, 52 AM. J.
INT'L L. 495 (1958).
25 J. JACKSON, supra note 4, at 35-37.
26 The principal obligations of GATT, the tariff bindings, are contained in Article II. GATT,
supra note 4, at art. II.
27 Principles of non-discrimination are found throughout the GATT, significant examples be-
ing the MFN obligation of Article I and the national treatment clause of Article Ill. Id. at arts. I
and III.
28 These objectives of GATT are set forth in the preamble to GATT. Id. at preamble.
29 K. DAM, THE GATT - LAW AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 319 (1970).
State Trading
3:662(1981)
private traders.3" Secondly, contracting parties to GATT are obligated
to limit implicit quotas caused by state trading.3 Finally, Article
XVII(4) requires notification to the CONTRACTING PARTIES of
the products which are imported and exported by state trading
countries.3 2
Like its predecessor in the ITO draft charter 3 3 Article XVII ap-
plies to state public enterprise, private enterprise granted exclusive or
special privileges, and import monopolies.3 4  The non-discrimination
clause of Article XVII is defined to require purchases or sales solely in
accordance with commercial considerations, including price, quality,
availability, marketability, transportation and other conditions of
purchase or sale. It also requires state trading countries to give the
enterprises of the other contracting parties adequate opportunity to
30 Article XVII of the GATT reads in part:
1. (a) Each contracting party undertakes that if it establishes or maintains a State
enterprise, wherever located, or grants to any enterprise, formally or in effect, exclusive or
special privileges, such enterprise shall, in its purchases or sales involving either imports or
exports, act in a manner consistent with the general principles of non-discriminatory treat-
ment prescribed in this Agreement for governmental measures affecting imports or exports by
private traders.
(b) The provisions of sub-paragraph (a) of this paragraph shall be understood to
require that such enterprises shall, having due regard to the other provisions of this Agree-
ment, make any such purchases or sales solely in accordance with commercial considerations,
including price, quality, availability, marketability, transportation and other conditions of
purchase or sale, and shall afford the enterprises of the other contracting parties adequate
opportunity, in accordance with customer business practice, to compete for participation in
such purchases or sales ...
2. The provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article shall not apply to imports of products
for immediate or ultimate consumption in governmental use and not otherwise for resale or
use in the production of goods for sale. With respect to such imports, each contracting party
shall accord to the trade of the other contracting parties fair and equitable treatment ...
5. (a) Contracting parties shall notify the CONTRACTING PARTIES of the prod-
ucts which are imported into or exported from their territories by enterprises of the kind
described in paragraph 1(a) of this Article ...
(c) The CONTRACTING PARTIES may, at the request of a contracting party
which has reason to believe that its interests under this Agreement are being adversely af-
fected by the operations of an enterprise of the kind described in paragraph l(a), reuest the
contracting party establishing, maintaining or authorizing such enterprise to supply informa-
tion about its operations related to the carrying out of the provisions of this Agreement.
(d) The provisions of this paragraph shall not require any contracting party to
disclose confidential information which would impede law enforcement or otherwise be con-
trary to the public interest or would prejudice the legitimate commercial interests of particu-
lar enterprises.
GATT, supra note 4, at art. XVII.
31 GATT, supra note 4, at Annex I, Ad. arts. XI, XII, XIII, XIV, and XVII.
32 GATT, supra note 4, at art. XVII(4). GATT uses the term "CONTRACTING PARTIES"
when refering to the members of GATT collectively and uses the term "contracting party" when
refering to an individual member nation.
33 See United Nations Conference, supra note 22. See generally J. JAcKSON, supra note 4, at
333-36; Mestmacker, State Trading Monopolies in the European Economic Community, 20
VAND. L. Rav. 321, 323-24 [hereinafter cited as Mestmacker].
34 GATT, supra note 4, at art. XVII(l)(a). For the text of Article XVII(1)(a), see note 30
supra.
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compete for participation in purchases and sales."
The set of interpretative notes appended to the GATT itself is the
principal source available for analyzing the language of Article XVII.3 6
These notes specifically exclude the purchase and sale of services from
coverage.37 National marketing boards which lay down regulations for
private trade are also exempt.38 Certain government measures relating
to the exploitation of natural resources are deemed not to constitute
"exclusive or special privileges" within the meaning of the Article.39
Finally, government procurement not destined for commercial resale is
treated under a less rigorous standard."
The "non-discriminatory treatment" language of Article XVII
(1)(a) suggests the application of Most Favored Nation principles to
state trading activities.4 A more theoretically interesting question is
whether the Article embodies a national treatment obligation.42 Here,
the commentators tend to disagree. It has been suggested that the gen-
eral national treatment of GATT Article 111(4) is broad enough to in-
clude Article XVII in its coverage.43 Such a conclusion relies on the
fact that the only exemption from national treatment within Article III
is paragraph 8, covering government purchase not with a view to com-
mercial resale, and hence applying national treatment obligations to
state trading operations.'
Professor Jackson, in his treatise, takes the opposing view,
explaining:
The national treatment obligation of Article III applies to internal taxa-
tion or regulation, (sic) it is stretching a point to say that this includes
purchases or sales. Consequently, it is possible to find that the state enter-
prise is not subject to a "national treatment obligation" as to its purchases
or sales, although the contracting party may be limited by the national
treatment obligation as to its internal taxation or regulation, portions of
which affect activities of the state enterprise.4 5
He concludes that "The enterprise is entitled to discriminate between
domestic and foreign products in its purchases or sales, but must do so
35 Id at art. XVII(l)(b). For the text of Article XVII(l)(b), see note 30 supra.
36 GATT, supra note 4, at Annex I, Ad. art. XVII.
37 Id at para. 2.
38 Id at para. I.
39 Id at para. 1(a).
40 GATT, supra note 30, at art. XVII(2).
41 J. JACKSON, supra note 4, at 345-47.
42 The national treatment of GATT Article III requires equal treatment of domestic and for-
eign goods for purposes of internal taxes and regulations.
43 K. DAM, supra note 29, at 321-22.
44 Id at 322.
45 J. JACKSON, supra note 4, at 338.
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"46on a 'Most-Favored-Nation' basis'.
The relative paucity of GATT disputes involving Article XVII has
resulted in largely theoretical interpretation of these obligations, de-
rived from the secondary literature and the interpretative notes. To
date, only three disputes under GATT have made reference to Article
XVII, and in none of these cases has there been a finding of inconsis-
tency with the article's provisions.47 The first dispute concerned the
Haitian tobacco monopoly, in which the GATT working party found
no violation of Article XVII.4 8 More than a decade later, a working
party considered the so-called "loyalty" rebate program of the British
Steel Corporation. The group met only once, and disbanded after the
suspension of the rebate program.49
The most substantive treatment of Article XVII came in a com-
plaint brought by Uruguay against a number of temperate zone produ-
cers of goods ranging from grains and vegetable oils to meats and
animal hides."0 Uruguay complained under Article XXIII of GATT of
a series of restrictive trade practices, including state trading.:1 The re-
port of the working party concluded for each country using state trad-
ing that there were "apriori grounds for assuming that (state trading)
could have an adverse effect on Uruguay's exports." ' 2 However, the
panel declined to recommend compensation for Uruguay, and limited
itself to urging consultation between the parties to settle their
differences.53
III. THE REQUIREMENTS OF ARTICLE 37 OF THE ROME TREATY
Article 37 of the EEC Treaty requires the elimination of discrimi-
46 I at 347.
47 It is important to note the general history of GATT dispute resolution under Article XXIII.
Article XXIII of GATT functions more as a consultation provision than a judicial dispute resolu-
tion mechanism. The only instance where the CONTRACTING PARTIES have authorized com-
pensation under Article XXIII for the nullification or impairment of GATT was the dispute over
the import restrictions of the United States against Dutch cheese. See Netherlands Measures of
Suspension of Obligations to the United States, Determination of 8th Nov., 1952, GATT, BASIc
INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS 32 (1st Supp. 1953).
48 GATT, Doc. L/454 (1955).
49 GATT, Doc. L/2958 (1967).
50 Uruguayan Recourse to Article XXIII, GATT, BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED Docu-
MENTS 95 (1lth Supp. 1963).
51 Uruguay also complained that its export trade was restricted by practices such as import
license and fee requirements, tax policies, health measures, tariff perferences, quotas and variable
levies.
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nation among Member States in the importation and marketing of
goods by state trading monopolies. The principal obligations of Mem-
ber States are found in the opening sections of the Article. Section (1)
calls for the progressive adjustment of state monopolies of a commercial
nature to eliminate discrimination. 4 This obligation applies to state
commercial monopolies regardless of whether they directly or indi-
rectly affect imports and exports between Member States."
Article 37(1) is complemented by 37(2), obligating Member States
to refrain from introducing any new measures which would violate Ar-
ticle 37(1). Under this framework, the Member States have undertaken
a dual obligation: "in the first place, an active one to adjust State mo-
nopolies, in the second place, a passive one to avoid any new
measures."
56
In addition to its limitation to state commercial monopolies, Arti-
cle 37 applies solely "to the conditions under which goods are procured
and marketed. . . ...7 State monopolies for services, such as energy
54 The full text of Article 37 reads:
1. Member States shall progressively adjust any State monopolies of a commercial character
so as to ensure that when the transitional period has ended no discrimination regarding the
conditions under which goods are procured and marketed exists between nationals of Mem-
ber States.
The provisions of this Article shall apply to any body through which a Member State, in
law or in fact, either directly or indirectly supervises, determines or appreciably influences
imports or exports between Member States. These provisions shall likewise apply to monop-
olies delegated by the State to others.
2. Member States shall refrain from introducing any new measure which is contrary to the
principles laid down in paragraph I or which restricts the scope of the Articles dealing with
the abolition of customs duties and quantitative restrictions between Member States.
3. The timetable for the measures referred to in paragraph I shall be harmonised with the
abolition of quantitative restrictions on the same products provided for in Articles 30 to 34.
If a product is subject to a State monopoly of a commercial character in only one or
some Member States, the Commission may authorize the other Member States to apply pro-
tective measures until the adjustment provided for in paragraph 1 has been effected; the Com-
mission shall determine the conditions and details of such measures.
4. If a State monopoly of a commercial character has rules which are designed to make it
easier to dispose of agricultural products or obtain for them the best return, steps should be
taken in applying the rules contained in this Article to ensure equivalent safeguards for the
employment and standard of living of the producers concerned, account being taken of the
adjustments that will be possible and the specialization that will be needed with the passage
of time.
5. The obligations on Member States shall be binding only in so far as they are compatible
with existing international agreements.
6. With effect from the first stage the Commission shall make recommendations as to the
manner in which and the timetable according to which the adjustment provided for in this
Article shall be carried out.
EEC Treaty, supra note 3, at art. 37. A thorough but dated examination of the language of Article
37 can be found in Mestmacker, note 33 supra. See also Van Ginkel, La Notion Juridique de
"Monopole National Prksentant un Caractlre Commercial" dans L"article 37 C.E.E., 13 REvUE DU
MARCHfl COMMuN 248 (1970).
55 EEC Treaty, supra note 3, at art. 37(1). For the text of Article 37(l), see note 54 supra.
56 Costa v. ENEL, [1964] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 585, 597, [1964] Comm. Mkt. L.R. 425, 458.
57 EEC Treaty, supra note 3, at art. 37(1). For the text of Article 37(1), see note 54 supra.
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generation and broadcasting, are excluded from coverage. 8 Further-
more, the Article is limited in its application to a body which "either
directly or indirectly supervises, determines, or appreciably influences
imports and exports.. .... 5 A national monopoly which organizes
the national market in the distribution stage would not be covered by
this Article. Hence, national marketing boards are exempt to varying
degrees from Article 37.60
Several exceptions are found in Article 37(3)-(5).61 National gov-
ernments are given considerable leeway to use state monopolies in their
agricultural policies.62 In addition, the obligations of Article 37 are
made binding only in so far as they are compatible with prior interna-
tional agreements.63
The major weakness in the Article is the nature of the enforcement
process. The language of Article 37 gives the European Commission
only advisory powers in setting the timetable for compliance by state
trading countries.6 Consequently, enforcement efforts have shifted to
the European Court of Justice.
The European Court is limited to developing the law on a case-by-
case basis in accordance with the peculiar mechanics of Article 177 of
the EEC Treaty. When the European Court of Justice is referred a case
from a national court under Article 177 it may deliver only an abstract
interpretation of Community law rather than a decision on the merits. 5
The abstract nature of these rulings has hindered the development of a
consistent and effective judicial doctrine interpreting Article 37.66
58 Costa v. ENEL, [1964] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 585, [1964] Comm. Mkt. L.R. 425; In Re
Sacchi, [1974] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 409, [1974] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 177.
59 EEC Treaty, supra note 3, at art. 37(1). For the text of Article 37(1), see note 54 supra.
60 Pigs and Bacon Commission v. McCarren and Company Ltd., [1979] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep.
2161, [1979] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 389.
61 Article 37(3) authorizes certain protective measures by non-state trading countries during a
twelve year transition period established by Article 8, which expired Jan. 1, 1970. EEC Treaty,
supra note 3, at art. 37(3). For the text of Article 37(3), see note 54 supra.
62 EEC Treaty, supra note 3, at art. 37(4). For the text of Article 37(4), see note 54 supra.
63 EEC Treaty, supra note 3, at art. 37(5). This clause applies principally to the German
match monopoly established through an agreement with the Swedish government. For the text of
Article 37(5), see note 54 supra.
64 EEC Treaty, supra note 3, at art. 37(6). For the text of Article 37(6), see note 54 supra.
65 K. LIPSTEIN, THE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY 32-33 (1974).
66 The best example of this is found in Albatros S.A.R.L. v. SOPECO, [1965] E. Comm. Ct. J.
Rep. 29, [1965] Comm. Mkt. L.R. 159, where the Court found that Article 177 barred it from
addressing the question of whether the French licensing laws for importing petroleum created a
state commercial monopoly within the meaning of Article 37, since such an inquiry would repre-
sent an impermissable decision on the merits of the case.
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IV. CASE LAW ON ARTICLE 37 EEC
In contrast to GATT, a substantial body of case law enforcing Ar-
ticle 37 in the European Court of Justice has arisen to help define the
broad language of the Treaty. In 1964, the Court held that Article 37
conferred direct rights upon Community nationals to be enforced
through the national and Community courts.6 7 This cleared the way
for litigation from importers threatened by the tax and trade legislation
of Member States.
The early cases dealt with the definition of the type of enterprise
covered by Article 37. Costa v. ENEL61 considered the nationalization
of Italy's electrical power industry. Costa, a consumer and shareholder
of one of the nationalized companies, brought suit urging a broad inter-
pretation of Article 37 to include the government's nationalization de-
cree. He argued that the nationalization produced the same
consequences as a legal monopoly in restricting imports and the com-
petitive opportunities of foreign firms.69 The ECJ rejected this conten-
tion, holding that Article 37 applies to state monopolies for goods
rather than services.7" The Court" noted,
[Article 37] does not prohibit the creation of any State monopolies, but
merely those 'of a commercial character,' and then only in so far as they
tend to introduce... discrimination .... To fall under this prohibition
the State monopolies and bodies in question must, first, have as their ob-
ject transactions regarding a commercial product capable of being the
subject of competition and trade between Member States. 7
The Court continued its restrictive interpretation of Article 37 in
Albatros S.A.R.L v. SOPECO.72 Albatros, an Italian firm, entered
into a contract to supply SOPECO, a French firm, with six thousand
tons of gasoline.73 SOPECO subsequently informed its supplier that it
had failed to obtain the necessary import licenses, and that the contract
could not be performed.74 Albatros sued in Italian courts, challenging
67 Costa v. ENEL, [1964] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 585, [1964] Comm. Mkt. L.R. 425. In contrast,
municipal courts have been reluctant in declaring the direct application of Article 37. Re German
Spirits Monopoly, [1971] Comm. Mkt. L.R. 687; Re Import of French Brandy, [1969] Comm. Mkt.
L.R. 164.
68 [1964] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 585, [1964] Comm. Mkt. L.R. 425.
69 Id at 591, [1964] Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 433.
70 Id at 598, [1964] Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 459.
71 Id Subsequent history of this case is found in an Italian domestic case which ultimately
voided the nationalization decree, although the court acknowledged that it was not required to do
so under Article 37. Costa v. ENEL, [1968] Comm. Mkt. L.R. 267.
72 Albatros S.A.R.L. v. Societe des Petroles et des Combustibles Liquides (SOPECO), [1965]
E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 29, [1965] Comm. Mkt. L.R. 159.
73 Id at 30, [1965] Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 159.
74 Id, [1965] Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 160.
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the French petroleum import system which made it extremely difficult
for foreign firms to receive import licenses. The Court noted that in
abstract Article 37's requirement of "progressive adjustment" did not
require the immediate abrogation of conflicting national laws.75 The
Court also held that its jurisdiction under Article 177 of the EEC
Treaty,76 barred it from even reaching the question of whether the
French licensing scheme fell within the scope of Article 37.77
The exclusive fights of importation, central to state trading, were
definitively addressed for the first time in Pubblico Ministero v.
Manghera,78 which scrutinized the Italian tobacco monopoly. Crimi-
nal proceedings had been instituted against an importer who brought
foreign manufactured tobacco into Italy. Upon referral from the na-
tional court, the European Court held that exclusive rights of importa-
tion were incompatible with the requirements of Article 37.79 This
holding was in agreement with the longstanding view of the European
Commission in this regard. 0
Later cases gave the Court the opportunity to look beyond facial
discrimination in state trading and examine the actual functioning of
national markets for state traded goods. In Hauptzolamt Gottingen v.
Miritz,1 the Court struck down a discriminatory tax structure used by
the German alcohol monopoly to limit the foreign imports it could no
longer directly prohibit. The Court stated:
Article 37(1) is not concerned exclusively with quantitative restrictions
but prohibits any discrimination . . . regarding the conditions under
which goods are procured and marketed between nationals of Member
States. It follows that its application is not limited to imports and exports
which are directly subject to the monopoly but covers all measurers which
are connected with its existence and affect trade between Member States
in certain products, whether or not subject to the monopoly.. *8
75 Id at 35, [1965] Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 178.
76 For a discussion of the limited nature of the court's jurisdiction under Article 177, see K.
LIPsTmN, note 65 supra.
77 [1965] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 29,34-35, [1965] Comm. Mkt. L.R. 159, 177. A French munici-
pal court, not bound by the restrictions of Article 177, had little trouble concluding the applicabil-
ity of Article 37 to the French petroleum system. Re Societe des Petroles Shell-Berre (Conseil
d'Etat June 19, 1964), [1964] Comm. Mkt. L.R. 462 482.
78 [1976] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 91, [1976] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 557.
79 Id at 101, [1976] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 567.
80 While not maintaining that these exclusive rights wereper se prohibited under Article 37,
the Commission felt that the abolition of exclusive importation rights was the most effective means
of compliance with the requirements of Article 37. See, e.g., J.O. COMM. EUR. (Spec. Ed. 2d) Ser.
VI (1974).
81 [1976] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 217.
82 Id at 229-30. 4ccord, Francesco Cinzano & CIA GmbH v. Hauptzollamt Saarbrucken,
[1970] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1089, [1971] Comm. Mkt. L.R. 374. Cinzano held that Article 37
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A more equitable system of taxation for spirits not marketed
through the German government survived challenge in ]Rewe v.
Hauptzollamt Landau. 3 As long as the tax was equally imposed on
both domestic and Community spirits, the Court was satisfied that the
practice violated neither the tax provisions of Article 9584 nor Article
37, even where the German alcohol monopoly was indirectly subsi-
dized by the tax payments." As a matter of principle, the Court also
noted that satisfying Article 95 alone did not establish compliance with
Article 37.86
Despite the favorable ruling in 1ewe, the German alcohol monop-
oly found itself severely strained by the introduction of spirits imported
from other Community nations. German farmers were paid fixed sup-
port prices, made possible by the sale of retail alcohol at artificially
high prices.17 The rapid increase in imports from Community nations
led to a decline in retail prices and burgeoning losses for the alcohol
monopoly.88
Substantial tax increases instituted to cover these losses were chal-
lenged in Hansen GmbH and Co. v. Hauptzollamt Flensburg.8 9 In 1976,
alcohol taxes were increased from 1500 DM to a total of 1950 DM per
hectoliter.9° On February 25, 1977, Hansen, an importing company,
contested the tax owed under the new laws.91 The case was referred to
included intervention where a State 'in fact' or 'indirectly' influenced trade between Member
States even when it did not control or supervise such trade. Id at 1095, [1971] Comm. Mkt. L.R.
at 386. These holdings should be contrasted with Peureux I, which held that neither Article 95
nor Article 37 prevented a Member State from taxing a domestic product more heavily than those
products imported from other Member States through state trading. S.A. des Grandes Distilleries
Peureux v. Directeur des Services Fiscaux de la Haute-Saone et du Territoire de Belfort, [1979] E.
Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 897, [19801 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 337.
83 [1976] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 181, [1976] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 1. A similar holding was
reached with respect to a tax increase during the transitional period in Francesco Cinzano & CI4
GmbH v. Haupizollamt Saarbrucken, [1970] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1089, [1971] Comm. Mkt. L.R.
374.
84 Article 95 prohibits taxation of Community products in excess of that of domestic products
or taxation used as a barrier to trade. EEC Treaty, supra note 3, at art. 95.
85 [1976] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 200-01, [1976] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 26.
86 Id at 197, [1976] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 24.
87 Hansen GmbH and Co. v. Hauptzollamt Flensburg, [1979] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 935, 960,
[1980] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 162, 167 (opinion of advocate general Capotorti) [hereinafter cited as
Hansen II]. It is important to note the distinctions between Hansen II and a prior case involving
the identical parties where the European Court of Justice had expressed a preference for using art.
95 to judge tax measures effected through state trading. Hansen GmbH v. Hauptzollamt Flen-
sburg, [1978] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1787, [1979] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 604.
88 [1979] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 960, [1980] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 167.
89 [1979] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 935, [1980] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 162.
90 A hectoliter is equivalent to 26.4 U.S. gallons.
91 [1979] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 938, [1980] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 165.
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the European Court to consider whether state trading measures which
were also state aids to national industry should be judged in light of
Article 37 or the state aid provisions of Articles 92 and 93.92 Depend-
ing on the answer to the first question the Court was also asked to ex-
amine whether the German tax increases were compatible with Article
37(1-2). 93
The Court utilized Article 37 as the framework to judge all state
measures tied to the exercise of a commercial monopoly. Hansen held
that state measures inherent in the exercise of the exclusive rights of a
state commercial monopoly must be considered in light of Article 37,
even when these measures are arguably a grant of aid to a producer
subject to the monopoly. 94 The Court also held that the marketing of
spirits with the aid of public funds at an abnormally low pre-tax resale
price, in comparison to those imported from other Member States, was
in violation of Article 37.95
The second in a set of cases involving the French firm S.A. des
Grundes Distilleries Peureux, Peureux I1,96 continued the expansive
reading of Article 37 before the European Court of Justice. The
Peureux company had imported from Italy oranges steeped in alcohol,
claimed to be a violation of French law prohibiting the distillation of
all imported raw material, with the exception of fresh fruit other than
92 The specific questions of law were:
1. Is Article 37 of the EEC Treaty alex specials in relation to Articles 92 and 93 of the
EEC Treaty in the sense that State measures which affect the movement of goods between
member-States and, where applicable, between member-States and third countries must be
judged in the light of Article 37 of the EEC Treaty even if the State measures contain inter
alia an aid?
2. If Question I is answered in the affirmative:
a) Is Article 37(2) in conjunction with the first subparagraph of Article 37(1) of the EEC
Treaty on the prohibition of discrimination between nationals of member-States regarding
the conditions under which goods are procured and marketed to be interpreted as also cover-
ing State measures which entail an identical increase in the tax on consumption on imported
and domestic goods, the income from which is credited to the general budget and is indirectly
intended to compensate for the losses of a State monopoly of a commercial character which
are incurred because certain producers are paid an excessive price which does not accord with
market conditions within the Community and because at the same time the selling prices for
the products purchased at the excessive prices have been reduced?
b) Is Article 37(2) of the EEC Treaty prohibiting the introduction of measures which restrict
the scope of the article dealing with the abolition of customs duties to be interpreted as also
including measures of the kind referred to in Question 2(a)?
Id at 939, [1980] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 165-66.
93 Id, [1980] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 166.
94 Id at 953, [1980] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 185.
95 Id at 955, [1980] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 186.
96 S.A. des Grandes Distilleries Peureux v. Directeur des Services Fiscaux de la Haute-Saone
et du Territoire de Belfort, [1979] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 975. For a description of Peureux I, see
note 82 supra.
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apples, pears or grapes. 97 The French authorities construed the statute
as prohibiting this particular import, since the oranges had been pre-
served in alcohol, and thus fell outside the fresh fruit exception to the
import ban.98 Peureux challenged this interpretation and the underly-
ing compatibility of the statute with the EEC Treaty. The European
Court held that the statute was incompatible with both Article 37 and
Article 30 of the EEC Treaty.9
9
Despite the reach of Article 37 beyond simple import restrictions,
the European Court has refused to subject every aspect of state trading
to scrutiny under this Treaty provision. The limits of Article 37 were
most recently spelled out in a second case involving the importer Rewe,
known as the Cassis de Dijon case.°10 Rewe challenged a German reg-
ulation prohibiting the importation of spirits with an alcohol content of
less than 30 percent. Although the import ban was defended as a
health measure, this regulation had the effect of banning the importa-
tion of certain low alcohol liqueurs, popular in other Community
states. The European Court held that Article 37 did not prohibit such
a regulation since it affected a practice not related to the commercial
nature of the state trading enterprise. The Court said:
It should be noted... that Article 37 relates specifically to State monop-
olies of a commercial character. That provision is therefore irrelevant
with regard to national provisions which do not concern the exercise by a
public monopoly of its specific function-namely, its exclusive right-but
apply in a general manner to the production and marketing of alcoholic
beverages, whether or not they later are covered by the monopoly in
question.10 1
V. THE IMPACT OF ARTICLE 37 ON TRADE WITHIN THE EEC
A fundamental controversy over the application of Article 37 is
whether its provisions mandate the eventual elimination of state trad-
ing within the EEC. However desirable this result may be on policy
grounds, it must be noted that the explicit language of the Article calls
merely for the "progressive adjustment" state trading to eliminate dis-
crimination and not the abolition of state commercial monopolies. Po-
litically, it also seems unlikely that France, Germany and Italy would
97 Id at 977.
98 Id
99 Id at 987.
100 Rewe-Zentral v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung fur Branntwein, [1979] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep.
649, [1979] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 494.
101 Id at 662, [1979] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 508.
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have agreed to abolish important sectors of their economies at the time
of the EEC Treaty.
Commentators unhappy with the scope of Article 37 have sug-
gested greater reliance on the stricter provisions of Articles 30 through
36 in enforcement efforts.'0° The ultimate question raised by Article 37
is whether discriminatory practices can be eliminated without altering
the structure of state trading enterprises. The ECJ has never addressed
this question directly, nor has the Court been entirely consistent as to
what practices are permissible.
The Court, instead, has removed almost all the economic incen-
tives for state trading, without ruling these enterprises out of existence.
Although the final decision to abolish a particular state commercial
monopoly has been left to the national legislatures, the court's manner
of interpreting the language of Article 37 has left itself open to the
charge that its rulings have gone beyond the literal language of the
treaty. Eliminating exclusive rights of importation was interpreted as a
signal of the end of state trading itself.10 3
The Court has also demonstrated its willingness to use Article 37
to judge more subtle, less facial forms of discrimination effected
through state trading. The holdings in Miritz104 and Hansen1 05 in-
quired deeply into the actual performance of the German alcohol mar-
ket. The German alcohol monopoly could not structure that market as
it wished since the Court's blocking of the tax initiatives eliminated a
major source of revenue needed to pay the subsidies to German farm-
ers. These holdings took away both the incentive and the means for the
state monopoly to continue to function as a true state trading enter-
prise, judicially transforming it into a mere distributor for domestically
produced spirits.
The Court now uses Article 37 as the framework to judge all forms
of state commercial monopolies within the EEC, regardless of whether
they produce effects covered by other treaty provisions. Since the ECJ
has focused on the practices of these enterprises rather than prohibiting
them outright, the Court need not worry about all forms of state trad-
ing equally. The distortions caused by state trading vary with the goals
and market power of the governments involved. Recognizing that state
102 See Note, Recent Case Law on Article 37EEC, 17 CoMM. MKT. L. REv. 251 (1980); Wyatt,
New Light on Article 37, 1 EuR. L. REV. 307 (1976).
103 Amaducci & Appfel, L'Affaire Mangherv Vers la Fin des Monopoles des Tabacs Manufac-
tures?, 19 REvuE Du MARCH COMMUN 427 (1976).
104 Hauptzollamt Gottingen v. Miritz, [1976] E. Comm. Ct. 3. Rep. 217.
105 Hansen GmbH and Co. v. Hauptzollamt Flensburg, [1979] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 935,
[1980] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 162.
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trading appears in many forms, the ECJ has applied two different stan-
dards in judging state trading practices.
The Court's strongest stance has been its outright ban on exclusive
importation rights." 6 In contrast, state trading used to subsidize na-
tional industries has been treated less harshly and is prohibited only on
a showing of actual discrimination against the trade of Member
States.' 7 The consequences of these two different uses of state trading
are distinctive enough to justify a dual standard. The quantitative re-
strictions resulting from exclusive rights are nearly universally con-
demned because of the increase in price and accompanying decrease in
welfare surplus derived from the imposition of quotas. 10 8 On the other
hand, subsidies produce effects of a more indeterminate nature, not
necessarily detrimental, depending on whether savings are passed
along to consumers. 10 9 Compared to quotas, the pernicious effect of
subsidies rests more on the priorities of the critic, who must balance the
interests of trading partners against a domestic government's need to
address national problems. To apply an outright ban to subsidies un-
duly limits a government's ability to address genuine needs, whether it
be regional development or economic stabilization. 10
The European Court of Justice has generally been consistent in
adhering to a two tier standard for judging state commercial monopo-
lies. In judging practices other than direct import restrictions, the
Court has searched for some showing of actual discrimination against
the trade of other Community nations. Peureux II I continues the ab-
solute ban on explicit import restrictions, while in other recent cases the
Court still permits the State to pursue policies through state trading
that encourage imports from other EEC states.1 12 These cases suggest
that future taxation schemes will be overturned under Article 37 only if
the taxes tend to discourage the importation or marketing of Commu-
106 Pubblico Ministero v. Manghera, [1976] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 91, [1976] 1 Comm. Mkt.
L.R. 557.
107 Rewe v. Hauptzollamt Landau, [1976] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 181, [1976] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R.
I.
108 C. KINDLEBERGER & P. LINDERT, supra note 12, at 518.
109 J. JACKSON, supra note 1, at 442.
110 Different standards in judging quantitative restrictions and subsidies are used throughout
the EEC Treaty, note 3 supra. Compare EEC Treaty Articles 30-34 with EEC Treaty Articles 92-
94.
111 S.A. des Grandes Distilleries Peureux v. Directeur des Services Fiscaux de la Haute-Saone
et du Territoire de Belfort, [1979] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 975.
112 S.A. des Grandes Distilleries Peureux v. Directeur des Services Fiscaux de la Haute-Saone





The Court deviated considerably from this standard in Cassis de
Dijon.14 A complete ban on the importation of certain liqueurs was
sustained as falling outside the commercial nature of monopolies ad-
dressed in Article 37.111 Yet it would seem that an outright ban of a
competitive alcoholic beverage in a state trading industry would be an
exercise of commercial decision making. A statute's alleged usefulness
as a health measure is but one factor in evaluating the necessity of
resorting to quantitative restrictions. The burdens of intra-Community
trade must be weighed against the putative public health value of such
a measure.'
16
Overall, the decisions of the ECJ, along with the administrative
actions of the European Commission 1 7 have had the effect of eliminat-
ing outright a number of state trading industries. Unlike the Court, the
Commission has expressed its preference for the outright abolition of
state trading in relation to other EEC states.118 The Commission's 1971
Report on Competition Policy reported the actual or promised aboli-
tion of Italy's commercial monopolies on salt, cigarette papers, flints
and lighters, as well as France's monopolies on matches and certain
fertilizers. 119 Most recently, the Italian government, in response to
longstanding Commission urgings, abolished the state monopoly on
113 Hansen GmbH and Co. v. Hauptzollamt Flensburg, [1979] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 935,
[1980] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 162; Hauptzollamt Gottingen v. Miritz, [1976] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep.
217; Rewe v. Hauptzollamt Landau, [1976] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 181, [1976] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R.
1.
114 Rewe-Zentral v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung fur Branntwein, [1979] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep.
649, [1979] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 494.
115 Id, at 662, [1979] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 508.
116 Such a balancing is routinely undertaken in United States constitutional law in judging
state laws based on health grounds under the Commerce Clause. See Philadelphia v. New Jersey,
437 U.S. 617 (1978); Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366 (1976); Dean
Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951). Cf. Tupman Thurlow Co. v. Moss, 252 F.
Supp. 641 (M.D. Tenn. 1966) (overturning Tennesee's labeling and licensing requirements for out
of state meat as unduly burdensome and discriminatory to interstate and foreign commerce).
117 The European Commission is the executive body of the EEC. Its powers are derived from
numerous places in the EEC Treaty. It is most analagous in its authority to the Federal Trade
Commission in the United States. Article 37(6) gives the Commission advisory powers with re-
spect to the Member States' obligation to adjust their state monopolies of a commercial nature.
Article 169 authorizes the Commission to bring compliance actions in the European Court of
Justice. See generally, E. STEIN, P. HAY & M.-WAELBROECK, EUROPEAN CommuNmrry LAW AND
INsTItUTIONs IN PERspEcTIVE 38-42 (1976).
118 COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, THIRD REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY
103 (1974).
119 COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN CoMMUNITIEs, FIRST REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY
152 (1972).
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saccharin and artificial sweeteners. 120
The Commission enthusiastically reported in 1976 that "as a result
of the Commission's action, almost all monopolies have been elimi-
nated throughout the Community.' 121 In light of the continuing activ-
ity of the ECJ in regard to Article 37, this is certainly an overstatement.
Today, the Commission and Court are still embroiled in enforcement
actions directed against the French tobacco, alcohol and petroleum
monopolies, and the Italian match and tobacco monopolies, 122 and the
problems caused by the accession of state-trading countries into the
Communities.
123
VI. TOWARDS A GATT CODE ON STATE TRADING
In view of the overall success of Article 37 in limiting the discre-
tion inherent in state commercial monopolies, it is surprising that Arti-
cle 37 has never been suggested as a basis for regulations of wider
application. Even excluding questions of East-West trade, state trading
monopolies still play a significant role in the economies of the industri-
alized and lesser developed countries belonging to GATT. 124
The need for addressing this problem is twofold. First, the infre-
quent application of GATT Article XVII has deprived it of any major
impact on the present contracting parties to GATT. Second, any fur-
ther expansion of GATT to include socialist economies must find some
mechanism that will allow market and planned economies to trade on
competitive terms. Without such an accomodation, any further expan-
sion of East-West trade will be shortlived.
However, it would be simplistic to argue that GATT can immedi-
ately benefit from a wholesale borrowing of the EEC standards for lim-
iting state trading monopolies. It is important to realize that the
relative ineffectiveness of Article XVII is not merely the product of its
language, but the nature of GATT. Unlike the EEC, GATT has an
120 13 BULL. EUR. COMM. (No. 3) 32 (1980).
121 COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, SIXTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY
137 (1977).
122 COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, NINTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY
127-30 (1980). See, e.g., French Tobacco Monopoly Revises Distribution, Press Release from the
Commission of the European Communities, No. IP (80) 106, Brussels, April 30, 1980, reprintedin,
3 COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) T 10,222 (May 28, 1980).
123 Ja~les, State Monopolies of a Commercial Character (Article 37 of EEC Treaty) and their
Importance in Connection with Portugal's Accession to the European Communities, 10 GA. J. INT'L
& COMp. L. 411 (1980).
124 M. CAMPS, THE CASE FOR A NEw GLOBAL TRADE ORGANIZATION 57 (Council on Foreign




extremely large membership composed of nations separated by geogra-
phy, levels of development, and type of economy. 125 Since GATT does
not have a well developed executive or enforcement arm, consultation
and unanimous action, rather than majority vote, are required for ef-
fective decision making. This view of GATT is an equally plausible
explanation of the failings of Article XVII apart from the weakness of
the substantive law being applied.
The weakness of GATT as an institution is reflected in the nature
of agreements, or side codes, produced in the 1979 Tokyo Round of
negotiations. 126 The codes created a new set of consultation measures
and procedures for unilateral actions by code signatories, 2 7 but created
few new positive obligations. The negotiation of a comprehensive side
code to limit state trading with enforceable new obligations would rep-
resent a step that GATT has so far been unwilling to take.
The dispute resolution code of the Tokyo Round may be a key
accomplishment in this regard.'2  The establishment of a well-defined
125 The failure of an International Trade Organization to come into existence has left GATT as
a treaty without a highly developed institutional structure to implement the substantive obliga-
tions agreed to by the parties. In contrast, the EEC Treaty itself sets forth the functions of an
executive, judiciary, and to a lesser extent, a legislative branch. See generally Thompson, Sympo-
sium on the European Economic Communityj-An Introduction, 3 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 287
(1981).
126 The side code has replaced actual amendment of GATT because of the practical difficulties
of the amendment process governed by GATT Article XXX which requires two-thirds, and some-
times unanimous, approval. Further, any amendments that are approved are binding only against
those contracting parties accepting them. See Jackson, The Birth of the GA47T-MTN System: 4
ConstitutionalAppraisal, 12 L. & POL. INT'L Bus. 21 (1980).
127 The Tokyo Round produced five codes:
1) Agreement on Implementation of Article VII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,
done Apr. 12,1979, GATT Doc. MTN/NTM/W/299/Rev. I reprinted in AGREEMENTS REACHED
iN THE TOKYO ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS, H.R. Doc. No. 153, pt. 1, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1979) (Customs Valuation Code);
2) Agreement on Government Procurement, done Apr. 11, 1979, GATT Doc. MTN/NTM/W/
21 I/Rev. 2, reprinted in H.R. Doc. No. 153, supra, at 69;
3) Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, done March 29, 1979, GATT Doc. MTN/NTM/
W/192/Rev. 5, reprinted in H.R. Doc. No. 153, supra, at 211;
4) Agreement on Implementation and Application of Articles VI, XVI and XXIII of the General
Agreements on Tariffs and Trade, done Apr. 12, 1979, GATT Doc. MTN/NTM/W/236, reprinted
in H.R. Doc. No. 153, supra, at 259 (Subsidies Code);
5) Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,
done Apr. 9, 1979, reprinted in H.R. Doc. No. 153, supra, at 311 (International Antidumping
Code).
For a discussion of the agreements themselves and their expected impact on international trade,
see deKieffer, GAYT"Dispute Settlements: A New Beginning in International and U.S. Trade Law, 2
Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 901 (1981); Symposium on the Multilateral Trade Agreements (pt. 1-2), 11
L. & POVY INT'L Bus. 1257-1526 (1979), 12 L. & PoL'Y INT'L Bus. 1-334 (1979); (Symposium) 13
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 145-290 (1980).
128 See deKieffer, note 127 supra.
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mechanism for the resolution of disputes between contracting parties is
a vital step in the evolution of a jurisprudence for GATT which would
permit judicial rather than political solutions to disagreements where
national interests are at stake. Significantly, the creation of this dispute
resolution code comes at a time when contracting parties are increas-
ingly unable to reconcile their differences through conciliation. 129 The
growth of a formal dispute resolution system within GATT holds out
the possibility of the enforcement of judicial standards in decision mak-
ing, and hence the promise of fashioning a comprehensive state trading
code.
However, one commentator has already concluded that GATT Ar-
ticle XVII, alone, would be an insufficient foundation for such a
code. 130 An alternative to the drafting of entirely new standards and
interpretations for such a code is the incorporation of the language and
doctrine of Article 37. The seeds for a state trading code are contained
in the positive obligation of Article 37(1) to adjust state monopolies to
prevent discrimination, replacing the murky and ineffective standards
of Article XVII.
In addition to strengthening the requirements of GATT in this
area, the dual standards used in interpeting the language of Article 37
seem suitable to the needs of GATT. The deference given to the use of
state trading to implement subsidies would sidestep what has been *a
major divisive issue for the contracting parties.' 3 ' At the same time,
such a code would continue to emphasize GATT's prohibition on the
use of quotas. 132
The narrow scope of Article 37 suggests a greater acceptance and
implementation compared to the current broad but fuzzy provisions
129 See GA7TTAslcedto Settle 13 Trade Disputes in '80, Wall St. J., April 23, 1981, at 26.
130 M. CAMPS, note 124 supra.
131 The issue of subsidies is a diplomatically sensitive one since they invariably involve foreign
governmental action. The contracting parties of GATT have been particularly split on this issue
between the industrialized and the lesser developed nations. Amendments to GATT Article XVI
added obligations against using an export subsidy on primary products which results in obtaining
more than "an equitable share of world export trade in that product. . ." and prohibited subsi-
dies on the export of non-primary products which result in an export price lower than the compa-
rable price of like goods which are not exported. The lesser developed countries objected to the
distinction between primary and non-primary goods, thereby working to the detriment of econo-
mies dependent upon the export of raw commodities. To date, the amendments to Article XVI
have been accepted, and are binding upon, the industrialized nations within GATT. J. JACKSON,
supra note 1, at 754-56.
132 Compare GATT Article XI with GATT Articles VI and XVI. Article XI is a.general prohi-
bition on the use of quantative restrictions for both imports and exports. Articles VI and XVI
prohibit only export subsidies, and deal with the problem by authorizing countervailing duties as
a response for injured contracting parties.
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governing state trading. The limitation of Article 37 to state commer-
cial monopolies provides sufficient precision for use in dispute resolu-
tion, a major failing of Article XVII of GATT.133 The focus on
commercial activity would preclude regulation of politically sensitive
monopolies used for strategic and fiscal purposes.
A GATT code on state trading would direct enforcement efforts
towards the other substantive obligations, which may be impaired
through the widespread use of state trading. A state trading code
would also be the beginning of a path towards a mechanism for fruitful
trade between market and planned economies, each based on divergent
and seemingly irreconcilable premises.
Spencer Weber Waller*
133 See notes 47-53 and accompanying text supra.
* Special thanks to Professor Kenneth W. Abbott of Northwestern University Law School
and Professor John H. Jackson of the University of Michigan Law School for their advice and
assistance.
